I imagined this space in part to try out ideas, to work and rework them in new ways, to try to articulate thinking that's familiar to me but might look very different if written or rewritten out. Aside from this, so much of academic discourses as they unfold consist of a lot of people in orbit around a common thought trying to articulate it from their different vantages.
In my own field, the overlap in trajectories is evident in recent work like Islam in Liberalism, and The Impossible State, and Questioning Secularism, and Politics of Secularism in International Relations. They are all, as one of the authors says, wrestling in the same fog.
That said, my topic of "the trouble with liberalism and especially its mainstay concern of freedom" has been taken up and resumed so many times, how could I say anything newly impactful? From the communitarian criticism of Rawls to the critique of liberalism and imperial-settler politics in postcolonial thought, I haven't even read all of the interventions by formative voices.
I can only plead that I'm using the blog as a starting position, a place to collect the odds and ends of other projects, take input from collaborators, and look for where to look next.
So, to the point here: I want to talk about two problems that inhere in liberal thought and the idea that we might not avoid them but might hope to deal. These problems of ours are libertinism and libertarianism
I'm calling libertinism the living of life to maximize one's power. I'm calling libertarianism the philosophy of expansion of power in the world- provided it is not state power strictly understood. The first is a simple intellectual caricature I want changed, the second a more involved problem.
As for the first. A libertine, conventionally, is a de Sade-like figure who conforms to everything socially expected but behaves abusively in private. Setting aside what "abuse" could mean in contexts as different as 18th-century France and America today, I think we can meaningfully generalize this caricature of vice.
Just recently, I can point to Martin Marty's essay on the Ashley Madison hacks, and a need to go beyond prurience and shaming of hypocrites in thinking productively about privacy and freedom and a modern moral theology, if that's to be done at all.
And it's in that space of a personal guidance, an idea of a full life as opposed to one only concerned with personal maximization offered in the neoliberal world, where liberalism tends to be ethically mute.
Must it have been so? No. There's the commonsense affective moral thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, but that's more or less gone from the picture, and I'm not talking about restoration of the lost here.
The other main problem is the more serious. Libertarianism discredits its foundational philosophical tradition because it's been a force unleashed on the world that has brought about deeply unfree state.
It seems more and more, economic historians can connect the rise and concretion of free markets to unfree labor. That new-world capitalism was built on Atlantic slavery is a familiar fact, but after slavery disentangled from colonialism, the liberating Western empires organized more efficient, more decentralized, and more modern system of conscript labor at the base, as the basis, of the world economy.
Of course, liberalist economics, and neo-liberalism, its 20th-century successor, is only a branch of the tradition, albeit the most prominent one.
There were other parts of the tradition we have inherited that are vestigial now. There are the above mentioned attempts to ground morality in the human emotional constitution, which have come back a little in the thought of David Wong and Martha Nussbaum, the last major representative of this way of thinking.
Further back and afield, there's the deep connection of liberal reason to republican virtue. It's critical to the thought of Rousseau, though it's better known in what Alasdair MacIntyre calls the morality-terrorism of Robespierre and Saint-Juste, who wanted to restore the Roman republic to the new France. Some of this bold vision of remaking society and property survives in the Marxian ideas of freedom
It might be for that reason, or the exhaustion of modern possibilities of self-care or care for others in neo-liberal selfless individualism, that there doesn't appear to be the moral wherewithal to confront libertinism or libertarianism from their native tradition.
Or there doesn't look like one to me. I won't go through all the responses I've read to ideas of what ails liberalism. I won't discuss here the larger ideas that all liberalisms rotten and pernicious, all their freedoms nothing more than pathological nonsense and instruments of power. That is an idea, part of a big critical project held by people who understand liberality to be a number of things, even as their own thought does not go as far from liberalism as they might hope. *Stay tuned for the dissertation chapter on the history of critique.
But for the moment, I thought I could try to categorize some of the serious problems that the surviving mode of Western political thought abides with and only theorizes about to a limited extent. Where the thought strays far, and the solutions more creative, they lose touch with the basic norms of reasoning in which states operate, the economy is assessed, and politics, for better, and obviously worse, is contemplated.
Fukuyama said universal freedom is the end of political history, and whether we see his view as sinister or merely naïve and parochial, liberalism, with all its twists and obstructions is the structure that contains our normative thinking, and we are left to think about it.